Bab al-Mandab and the West Coast of #Yemen: The Changing Dynamics of Influence
English - Saturday 05 June 2021 الساعة 09:05 am
NewsYemen, South24:
On January 7, 2017, Operation Golden Spear was launched under the leadership of the Deputy Chief of Staff in the Ministry of Defense, Major General Ahmed Saif al-Yafei, in a qualitative military operation with the participation and support of the Arab coalition; In particular, the United Arab Emirates, in which the liberation process was undertaken by the participating southern military units of (support brigades - led by the Third Brigade Hazm led by Brigadier General Omar Al-Subaihi, and the First Brigade Hazm led by Brigadier General Abdul Ghani Al-Subaihi, the Giants Forces, and other forces led by the Minister Former defense: Haitham Qassem Taher.
These forces and military formations had the largest role in the leadership, as the main objective of the operation was to recover Bab al-Mandab and the cities of the western coast overlooking the Red Sea from the Houthis. Another northern force did not participate until after the liberation of the city of Mocha and the control of the "Khaled bin Al-Walid" camp, and the arrival of the southern forces to Al-Khokha as the first inhabited area of Al-Hodeidah Governorate, which it liberated with the support of the Tuhami resistance that fought its battles from Al-Khoukha shortly after its formation and training.
Operation Golden Spear succeeded in restoring the areas on the western coast, in succession, from Bab al-Mandab to Mokha and al-Khokha, and then the coastal line linking Hodeidah and Aden; Reaching parts of Hodeidah, the capital of the governorate, during 2017 and late 2018. The forces avoided fighting in populated areas on the opposite line on the road linking Taiz and Hodeidah, with the exception of the city of Hays. The Stockholm Agreement came as a truce between the parties to the Yemeni crisis, "the legitimate government and the Houthis", which was signed on December 13, 2018, under the auspices of the United Nations, at a time when the Southern Giants Brigades and the Tihama Resistance with the Arab Coalition intended to complete the liberation of the rest of the city of Hodeidah to its port and proceed its north towards the port of Saleef and the rest of the districts; This is in parallel with the "Navy Arrow" operation launched by the legitimate forces to clear the coasts of Midi and its affiliated islands of sea mines. Nevertheless, neither the Stockholm Agreement nor the Redeployment Coordination Committee that emanated from it has made progress, despite the flexibility shown by the Yemeni government in dealing with the Hodeidah file. However, the Houthis’ violation of the agreement and their intransigence contributed to an increase in the humanitarian crisis.
It should be said that the process of liberating the western coast and the islands opposite it, starting from Mayon Island on the strait administratively affiliated with the governorate of Aden to the city of Hodeidah towards the north, was of great strategic importance in terms of securing the most important sea shipping lanes in the region, and closing one of the most prominent smuggling doors that were carried out through The coasts by the Houthis, as well as supplying the fighting lines in the operations to complete the liberation of the coast. The Red Sea, from the side of Yemen, before its liberation from the Houthi presence, represented a major threat to international trade and transport, as the Houthis were launching anti-missile attacks on ships transiting towards the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are believed to have supplied. The Emirati high-speed ship "Swift 2", formerly owned by the US Navy and sold to the United Arab Emirates in 2015 [1], is one of the ships damaged in those attacks. as well as attacks on some Saudi ships; Such as the attack, which the coalition leadership considered a threat to the security of navigation, by the Houthis targeting a Saudi frigate west of the port of Hodeidah, which resulted in an explosion as a result of the attack of three suicide boats, one of which collided with the stern of the frigate. Prior to that, the attack on the US destroyer USS Mason in 2016. It coincided with intermittent attacks on Yemeni civilian oil tankers crossing the strait.
The general situation for the Houthis was difficult, as they came out of the coast tour with a heavy loss, which made them intensify their missile strikes with very precise military operations, one of which led to the killing of Major General Ahmed Saif al-Yafei, who led the "Golden Spear" and a number of his companions in Bab al-Mandab. Prior to that, Major General Omar al-Subaihi was killed by snipers near Bab al-Mandab as well. The killing of al-Yafi’i has caused controversy and accusations, some of which point to the hypothesis of leaking coordinates to the Houthis with a high-accuracy direct hit to his tent. without mentioning his military equipment.
The most important commercial nerve
The focus on the importance of the Bab al-Mandab strait was not without reason, as its importance lies in the fact that it is one of the most important waterways in the world and the most incubating for ships, linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, through which 25,000 ships pass every year, representing 7% of global navigation, and more than Its importance is due to its connection with the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz [2]. In fact, Bab al-Mandab is one of the most important links in the course of international trade, especially with the increasing importance of Gulf oil, as the number of ships and giant oil tankers that pass through it in both directions is estimated at more than 21,000 marine pieces annually (57 pieces per day) [3]. In the heart of the Bab al-Mandab Strait lies the island of Perim or (Mayyun), which divides it into two sea passages, one of which is narrow east; Its width is less than 4 km, and the western part is estimated to be about 23 km wide. The strait extends between the two banks, starting from Ras Bab al-Mandab in the east to Ras Sian in Djibouti in the west, about 30 km.
"The southerners dealt with Mayon Island in terms of history, geography and politics"
Moreover, the strait enjoys great military and security importance. Egypt had previously closed it to Israel during the 1973 war. Also, an American force worked to secure navigation in the strait after the September 2001 attacks in the United States; To counter al-Qaeda and pirates in the region.
Controlling the Bab al-Mandab Strait is a strategic advantage for Yemen. For owning the island of Mayon. The island belonged to South Yemen, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, before the declaration of Yemeni unity in 1990.
The southerners dealt with the island of Mayun, which is of strategic importance because it overlooks the Bab al-Mandab Strait; From the point of view of history, geography and politics of its subordination to South Yemen before the Yemeni unity, which was reflected in the dimensions that formed their motives after the outbreak of the civil war in Yemen 2015, the most important of which is their desire to recover it from the Republic of Yemen within the project to restore the state; This is the reason why they also led the military battles that liberated the areas overlooking Bab al-Mandab from the Houthi presence in early 2017.
Southern forces impose themselves
he narrative that accuses Abu Dhabi of controlling the Yemeni islands continues, the latest of which was accusations of influencing the Mayon island located in the heart of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which was quickly denied by an official in the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia, explaining that the forces in Mayon are under the control of the coalition leadership; What he said serves to empower the forces of legitimacy and the coalition to confront the Houthis, secure maritime navigation and support the forces of the West Coast [4]. In light of the indicators that were listed above about the process of liberating the Bab al-Mandeb areas from the Houthis through the “golden spear” in 2017, the presence of the Arab coalition forces on Mayon Island came in coordination and coordination with southern military forces deployed along the strait and the island, which in turn liberated this strategic area And still protecting it.
Bab al-Mandab is a military axis in itself, and the entire force along its perimeter and security depth is a southern military force, as there are no other forces in the surrounding districts; Including Developed Al-Baha of the Fourth Military District, led by Major General Fadl Hassan. Therefore, it seems that the southern presence of the military units deployed on Bab al-Mandab eased the military pressure on the most important strategic area. The existing units, including: First Brigade Hazm, Third Brigade Hazm, forces from the giants, security belt forces, as well as the Saiqa forces, formed a joint military force, working as a team and one defensive force on Bab al-Mandab and the maritime navigation line. As a result, all of these military powers have enjoyed multiple levels of coalition support; Specifically from (Saudi Arabia and the UAE), which has strengthened its role in protecting the region in general.
"It is more appropriate for the coalition to continue to support reliable military forces that have demonstrated clear positions parallel to regional and international positions."
The nature of the competition over the most important strategic location, allowed the attempts of elements from other fronts affiliated with the Yemeni Islah party to infiltrate into Lahj governorate and its coastal districts, which are fronts where tension prevails with the southern forces, but the latter is confronting them because of the traditional state of hostility with the Islah party, which some describe as a military arm. to the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, the presence calculated on Islah is limited to mountainous areas south of Taiz, specifically the area of Al-Turbah, Al-Maqtarah, and Yafers, in addition to other camps stuck in the heights of Al-Hajariya, and a small force on the outskirts of Tur Al-Baha towards Al-Maqatirah; It has no effect compared to the anti-Southern forces on the other side - according to a military field source.
In light of this reality, it seems more appropriate for the policy of the Arab coalition as a strategic ally of the Southern Transitional Council and the southern military forces, some of which belong to the latter, to continue to support reliable military forces that have demonstrated clear positions parallel to regional and international positions, which require the need to protect maritime security and secure the door Mandib and the Red Sea, from any forces that would destabilize regional and international security; Especially since the Houthis, affiliated with Iran, had previously controlled all the areas overlooking the strait before they left by military force; In addition, the attempts of military forces controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood organization affiliated with Turkey to reach the strait after their control of important heights that supervise it.
Challenges on the West Coast
The forces of the southern giants and the forces of the movement and the Tihami resistance had priority in leading the battle of Hodeidah on the ground; Although the most prominent role was for the Giants’ forces led by Abu Zara’a al-Muharrami, the role of the Tuhami resistance gradually expanded since the beginning of the Battle of the West Coast in the part located in the province of Hodeidah; Starting from Al-Khoukha to the city of Al-Hodeidah, due to the popular support and the fighting motive against the Houthis for the members of those brigades geographically belonging to the region. The Tihama resistance began with five brigades, with the full support of the coalition, in training, rehabilitation, arming and financial credits. These brigades were supervised by the leader of the movement and the Tuhami resistance, Sheikh Abdul Rahman Hajri; He was a commander of the Tihami brigades and oversaw the mobilization and recruitment of these five brigades; Which was formed before the start of the battle to liberate Al-Khokha with the full support of the coalition; And then co-edited. Hajri was known as the commander of the Tuhami brigades, and he had to choose the leaders of the brigades by recommending them for approval by the coalition.
After Brigadier-General Tariq Saleh, who leads the "Guardians of the Republic" forces, entered the military scene in the coast in mid-2018; The Arab coalition supported the Tuhami brigades through channels other than the Tuhami movement, due to the movement’s leadership expressing discomfort with Tariq Saleh’s participation in the West Coast; As a result of the lack of funding for the Tuhami movement, many of its activists moved to work within the crews of Tariq Saleh’s forces. Criticisms began from activists of the movement and the Tuhami resistance for not engaging politically with the military developments in the coast; This divided the activists who were mobilizing around the movement between those who remained in support of the movement’s leadership and those who moved to support Tariq Saleh’s forces and began attacking the movement’s leadership while declaring their loyalty to the movement remained as a component. Therefore, it is not surprising that the forces that were in the hands of the leader of the movement and the Tuhami resistance, Sheikh Abd al-Rahman Hajri, have diminished, after most of them were distributed to operationally and financially follow the Republican Guard forces or the Tuhami forces that were established later and attached to the Giants forces.
Although the forces of the Third Brigade were scattered, the Tihami resistance; However, some of his forces were operationally controlled by the forces of the Second Brigade, the Tihami Resistance, led by Brigadier General / Fouad Bagadi, and became affiliated with the Republican Guard forces; Some of them were transferred under the command of the second brigade, Zaranik, which belongs to the giants’ forces; While the first brigade was able to resist the Tihami, led by Brigadier General Ahmed al-Kawbani, to stay away from joining the giants or the guards of the republic; With frequent accusations of his leader being close to the Muslim Brotherhood.
And the questions that arise here: Why did the Arab coalition continue to support the establishment of forces whose personnel are from Tihama and led by Tihama, despite the cessation of its support for the movement? Why were the brigades that were created later not included in the forces of Tariq Saleh and attached to the forces of the giants?
It is clear that the inclusion of the Tihamia forces under the leadership of the people of the region is a privilege that all the forces affiliated with the name of the "joint forces" in the western coast are competing for; All of them are backed by the Arab coalition, including the forces led by figures close to the Brotherhood, Salafist leaders, or Tahamic leaders from the sons of the military establishment.
Tariq Saleh won the privilege of annexing the remainder of the Tuhami forces, which were directly under the leadership of the movement; While the first brigade, Tihama, remained administratively independent and was accused of being close to the Brotherhood; As for the forces that were established after the withdrawal of the movement from the military scene, they were included in the giants; They are four brigades: the Seventh Giants Brigade, led by Brigadier General Ali Al-Kenini; The 9th Giants Brigade commanded by Brigadier General Yahya Wahish; The Eleventh Giants Brigade commanded by Colonel Mamoun Al-Majhmi; The second brigade, Zaraniq, commanded by Brigadier General Madin Qubeisi; The second brigade, Zaraneq, joined the giants after the leadership of the first brigade, Zaraneq, apologized for establishing a unified command for the first and second Zaraneq brigades.
The two brigades of Al-Zaraniq also depend on the Tuhamic character in naming, formation, and leadership; The Zaraniq tribe is a famous tribe for fighting the imams of the Mutawakkil Kingdom before the September 1962 revolution. The tribe controls most of the areas south of the city of Hodeidah.
Tohami sources attribute the apology of First Brigade Zaraneq, led by Brigadier General Suleiman Munser, for forming a unified command between him and Major General Zaraneq, to the proximity of Suleiman Munasser, the son of the leader of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform Yahya Munasser, from the Muslim Brotherhood. While the leadership of the second brigade Zaranik is affiliated with the Salafi movement.
According to the diversity of the leadership of the Tuhami brigades and its favoritism for diversity within the joint forces; Brigadier General Tariq Saleh has had more than one brigade and less than two Tuhamian brigades (the second and some of the third). It was also noted that the media activity of Tariq Saleh's forces increased at the expense of the rest of the participating forces on the West Coast; Changing the media discourse funded by him, such as naming his forces from the “Guardians of the Republic” to the “National Forces” in imitation of the designation of the “Tuhami Forces” that emerged from the movement’s control; It is the name that has gradually begun to dissolve at the expense of (Tahami resistance); Which previously enjoyed a large popular incubator that could not be replaced by the change in the designation of the “Guardians of the Republic” to the “National Resistance”, especially since the Tohami Brigade in its strength does not constitute a large percentage of its total forces.
As for the giants' forces, it includes four brigades, "the seventh giants", "the ninth giants", "the eleventh giants" and "the second giants". Two brigades remain, each with a separate command and close to the Muslim Brotherhood (the first is Tihama and the first is Zaraniq).
As for the dynamics of military deployment, the forces belonging to the Tihama are distributed as follows:
The city of Al-Khokha and the corresponding islands: it is spread in Al-Khoukha and the islands of Hanish, Al-Tair and Zaqar; The Fourth and Fifth Brigades of the Tihamia Resistance, led by Colonel Murad Sheraei.
The Tuhayta Front: The 1st Brigade is the Tihami Resistance and the 9th Brigade forces are giants.
Hays fronts: The forces of the Seventh and Eleventh Brigades take over the majority of the sectors and combat axes; The forces of the second brigade charge the northern sector of the city of Hays.
Al-Hodeidah Front: The rest of the 3rd Brigade’s brigade unites the Tihami resistance in the Mandhar and Al-Saleh sectors on the northern and southern outskirts of the city of Hudaydah; The first brigade Zaraniq is deployed in Kilo 16; The second brigade is Zaraneq in Kilo 16 and even close to the city of Al-Saleh. In the city of Al-Saleh, only one battalion from the First Tihama Brigade and battalions from the Fourth and Fifth Brigades, Tihama.
Al-Durayhimi Front: 4th and 5th Brigades, Tihama.
The strategic dimensions of each force of the joint forces
The total of the joint forces on the West Coast can be divided into three forces with different objectives, united by one operational theater and one operation room: the sequence of their appearance and influence with the giants forces; Then the Tihama Resistance Brigades; Before later, the Republican Guard forces appeared in the wake of the military clash between the Houthis and the supporters of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Sanaa.
It can be said that the sensitivities that arose with the Tuhami movement from the beginning of the entry of the forces of Brigadier General Tariq Saleh - which he formed again - the theater of operations on the West Coast; The map of influence there differed after the forces of Tariq Saleh came second in influence after the forces of the giants led by Brigadier General Abu Zara'a Al Muharrami; Meanwhile, the Tuhami movement withdrew from the scene, which contributed to the emergence of a new player who had previously been difficult to appear in this theater; Represented by two brigades affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which came third in influence.
Despite their strong influence, the Giants Forces remain the force that has fewer incentives to stay long on the western coast, if a political settlement is reached or the battle of the city of Hodeidah is resolved militarily by liberating it from the Houthis; This is because of the creedal affiliation of the supreme leadership of the giants, as well as its regional affiliation to southern Yemen; Contrasting with forces accused of nepotism against the Brotherhood, which may adhere to the political goals of the organization at the general national or regional level; Or the forces of Tariq Saleh, who is rebuilding the presence inherited from his uncle, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and does not have a political and military stadium qualified to achieve this at the moment, other than the West Coast; This crystallized through the establishment of the Political Bureau of the National Resistance, which, as a political project, is also linked to the Swahili geographical scope. And perhaps, it vanishes as a political value if it goes outside this range.
The total of the joint forces on the West Coast can be divided into three forces with different objectives, united by one operational theater and one operating room.
The question remains: As long as the forces of the southern giants have been keen to establish four brigades of Tuhami strength as leaders and individuals, as compensation for the Tuhami movement’s withdrawal from the military scene, what will be the fate of these brigades if the rest of the non-Thami forces decide to return to fight the Houthis on the southern fronts or in the far north The north like Saada, for example?
The previous data suggest the return of the Arab coalition’s support to the Tuhami movement that emerged in 2011, and it still represents the Tihami resistance, despite the loss of its control over a large part of the Tuhami military brigades that were distributed among the rest of the member entities in the joint forces; The Republic’s Guardians forces or the Giants’ forces, although they manage the Tuhami fighters in their ranks, is not likely to be able to win the Tuhama popular incubator to the extent that the Tuhami movement represents the Tuhami cause, which is a strong common factor in favor of the Tuhami movement in which fighters and civilians from Tihama participate. Just as the Tuhami brigades that arose in the beginning emerged from the Tuhami resistance, the Tuhami resistance itself had emerged from the Tuhami movement; The movement's affiliation with the Tihama cause remains inclusive of all the people of Tihama, despite their differences, as a model similar to the bias of the southern cause among all the disparate southern parties.
It seems that the Tuhami movement has sent strong signals of its permanent attachment as a partner to the Arab coalition on the West Coast in the last press interview of its leader, Abd al-Rahman Hajri, with the London-based Al-Arab newspaper. And if the coalition’s previous reservations about the movement’s leadership were not essential; It is likely that the factors of the possibility of combining the Tuhami military affiliation and the Tuhami social incubator in the form of the Tuhami movement are possible; If the reservations that led to the previous suspension of support are exceeded.
In light of all this, it can be said that despite the constant change in the military dynamics in Bab al-Mandab and the western coast, the only constant for the Yemeni forces is the recovery of the rest of the areas from the Houthis, even if the strategic goals of each party differ.
Quoted from South24
