American Center: The deployment of Islah forces in Shabwa threatens the stability of the southern governorates of Yemen
English - Tuesday 02 November 2021 الساعة 08:15 am![](https://newsyemen.life/admin/images/uploads/766e84f21dbf64865a6c4e2f99908ed6.webp)
The Center for Gulf States Analysis in Washington highlighted the recent field gains of the Houthi militia, in the governorates of Al-Bayda, Shabwa and Marib, and the role of the forces affiliated with the Islah Party, in enabling the Houthis to control the Bayhan areas through their withdrawal towards the city of Ataq.
In an analysis prepared by Fernando Carvajal - who worked as an expert in the Security Council's Yemen expert team from April 2017 to March 2019 - the institute said that stability in the southern governorates is now threatened as a result of the redeployment of government forces in Shabwa in an attempt to settle a new center for Islah forces, especially in There are constant reports of the imminent fall of the city of Marib to the Houthis.
Carvajal added that: "The Islah party worked hard to protect its sphere of influence in Shabwa during the past six years of the war. Islah party officials, with the support of the governor of Shabwa, exploited favoritism, exploiting financial incentives or jobs, and distributing humanitarian aid provided by allies Qatar and Turkey."
The analysis indicated that Islah expanded its influence, taking advantage of the heavy losses among the tribal and government forces in the battles against the Houthis, while Abyan, Aden and Lahj bear the brunt of the Houthi threats.
He believed that the concentration of pro-Islah forces around Ataq might lead to the recruitment of these soldiers to counter the political protests against Islah and the (unwelcome) pro-Islah governor of Shabwa, Muhammad Salih bin Adyo, by civilians throughout the governorate.
He said, "The southerners accuse the government forces of abandoning their positions in al-Bayda and Bayhan and redeploying them in the center of Shabwa." Others simply wonder why "the government forces lost a lot of ground in the face of the Houthis, despite the generous support of the Arab coalition."
The text of the analysis, after it was translated verbatim from the Gulf States Analytics Center in Washington:
(Anatomy of Emerging Chaos: Shabwa, Yemen)
While the fighting in the Marib governorate is making international headlines, the conflict is escalating between the elements allied with the Southern Transitional Council and the Islah party in Shabwa, as Houthi gains in western Al-Bayda governorate and areas near the city of Marib have displaced thousands of civilians and forced government forces to withdraw towards Ataq, the capital of Shabwa.
This situation has raised new warnings by the United Nations envoy to Yemen, Hans Grundberg, in his latest briefing to the UN Security Council on the urgent need for the parties to return to peace talks, and the impending humanitarian crisis due to the armed conflict south of Ma'rib. Stability in the southern governorates is now threatened as a result of the redeployment of government forces in Shabwa in an attempt to settle a new center for the Islah forces, especially in light of the frequent news of the imminent fall of the city of Marib to the Houthis.
Four main factors have caused instability across southern regions: Houthi-captured areas in the neighboring cities of Al-Bayda and Marib, emerging Houthi threats in Abyan and Aden, the mobilization of pro-government reform forces around Ataq, and the collapse of the 2019 Riyadh Agreement.
While Abyan, Aden and Lahj bear the brunt of Houthi threats following the withdrawal of government forces from neighboring Bayda this summer, Shabwa governorate is now at the heart of a new front in the conflict between forces loyal to Islah and forces allied with the Southern Transitional Council.
Southerners see the withdrawal of the pro-government Islah party forces as a direct threat to their interests and a violation of the Riyadh Agreement. The concentration of government forces around Ataq may lead to the employment of these soldiers to counter political protests against Islah and the (unwelcome) pro-reform governor of Shabwa, Muhammad Salih bin Adyo, by civilians throughout the governorate.
The southerners also accuse the government forces of abandoning their positions in al-Bayda and Bayhan and redeploying them in the center of Shabwa. Others simply wonder why the government forces lost so much ground in the face of the Houthis, despite the generous support of the Arab coalition.
While the conflict in Shabwa is exacerbated by the threats posed by the Houthis, there are many other motivations rooted in the local rivalries. Six years after the liberation of the southern governorates from the Houthi forces, and nearly two years after the signing of the Riyadh Agreement between the Hadi government and the Southern Transitional Council, tension has increased between tribal parties, military leaders and political figures in the Islah Party and the Transitional Council.
Much of the blame for the economic and military failure across the southern regions is attributed to the Islah party. This is largely due to the number of military commanders leading government forces along the fronts in al-Bayda and Marib, as well as officials in the Economic Committee and the oil industry around President Hadi.
Moreover, the reason for the exacerbation of the conflict between the Southern Transitional Council and Islah is the frequent news that although most of the leadership of the Islah party is hosted by Riyadh, the highly influential wing of the party affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood still maintains close relations with Qatar, to obtain funding Humanitarian operations, sponsorship of tribal leaders, and disruption of the flow of LNG through Balhaf. Qatar is often called a mediator between a faction of Islah (mostly located in Taiz) and the Houthi rebels.
The grip of islah on legitimacy
Renewed tensions between Islah and the Southern Transitional Council go beyond control of territory in southern Yemen or oil resources. Islah, which represents a pillar of the Hadi government, is running high-risk bets, as the party aims to dominate the political scene in Yemen and shape a vision of peace in it, whether as a united state or a divided Yemen. For the Southern Transitional Council and its allies, Islah represents an existential threat throughout the southern regions, as its presence as a competitor constitutes the ultimate outcome of the war against the Houthis.
Southerners see that the government's weakness and military defeats are in the interest of the Islah party and its interests in the southern provinces. Islah officials inside and outside Yemen are looking forward to strengthening the party’s position as a signatory to the Gulf initiative in 2011, with the help of its loyalists such as Yemeni Vice President Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar and other officials to consolidate their legitimacy as natural successors to power, even if this is limited to half of the recognized Republic of Yemen.
The Islah Party has worked hard to protect its sphere of influence in Shabwa during the past six years of war. Islah party officials, backed by the governor of Shabwa, exploited nepotism, financial incentives or jobs, and the distribution of humanitarian aid provided by allies Qatar and Turkey.
With regard to the armed forces, Islah expanded its influence, taking advantage of the heavy losses among the tribal and government forces in the battles against the Houthis.
In Marib, for example, the fall of government army officers provided an opportunity for the Islah party to fill this void with high-ranking positions through its loyalists, with the unintended consequence of weakening the military, political, and social relations with the Marib tribes. The Houthis took advantage of this weakness by planting disadvantaged tribal elements and signing non-aggression agreements that allow Houthi forces to pass through the battle fronts.
In Shabwa, Governor Ibn Udayo, Deputy Governor Mohsen al-Haj, and Islah party leader Ahmed Mohsen Abboud are seen as vital sources of support for military and security officials, who are working to expand Islah's sphere of influence. One way to establish influence is to relocate Islah to military positions, many of which are incredibly high-ranking in Islah's areas of control.
Recently, leaked documents from local military offices revealed the appointments of loyal to islah teachers and university professors to key positions in army units.
Among the military officers who were reported to have attained high ranks as Islah loyalists are: Saleh Laqassem (commander of the 163rd Brigade), Mahdi Mushafir al-Qumaishi (commander of the 2nd Jabali Infantry Brigade) and Muhammad Sunaid (staff of the 21st Brigade War), who were formerly Shabwa teachers.
The Southern Transitional Council also accuses other pro-Islah military leaders of committing violations against civilians in Shabwa, including Aziz Al-Atiqi (commander of the Shabwa axis), Nasser Lasour (commander of the Petroleum Facilities Protection Forces), Jihad Hanash (commander of the 21st Brigade), and Salah Al-Harthi (commander of the 153rd Brigade). Most of them descended from the Awaliq tribes.
sanctuary and resources
For the Southern Transitional Council, the imminent fall of the city of Marib to the Houthi forces is a major reason for the deterioration of security in areas such as Shabwa. The fall of the city of Marib represents a great loss for the Islah party, as it has been the main haven for the party since it was expelled by the Houthis from Sanaa in September 2014.
The importance of Marib has emerged since the appointment of Ali Mohsen as vice president in April 2016, as he made the city a center of gravity for him and a base for the government in northern Yemen. The desert city experienced rapid growth in early 2016 as a haven for internally displaced persons who fled Houthi control.
*Fernando Carvajal: Served as an expert on the Security Council's Yemen Panel of Experts from April 2017 to March 2019. He has nearly 20 years of experience conducting fieldwork in Yemen and specializes in Yemeni politics and tribal relations.