State instead of the constitution, Hashemism instead of citizenship ... "Al Houthi" and the features of the separatist state
English - Sunday 30 May 2021 الساعة 09:47 am
Sana'a, NewsYemen, Special Report:
The thirty-first anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of Yemen passed on May 22, 1990 amidst a storm of controversy towards all parties, which Al-Houthi watched closely.
While the Brotherhood’s discourse fuels the continuation of southern and northern activists in their battles against each other and the exchange of contempt in discussions, the Houthi flames the battles between them, claiming here that he is a unitary against the south, and there claiming that he is biased towards the south, and in the third that he is a northerner seeking satisfactory solutions to the south.
Between the Houthis and the transitional ... who is separated?
With the exception of raising the flag of the pre-unification southern state, and media talks about the need to return to two states in the north and south, the Southern Transitional Council and most southern leaders that talk about the return of the state of the South so far are still part of the legitimate government of the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen, and they are exercising their various tasks And their executive, political and media activities, and they manage the state institutions under their control or within the scope of their executive share based on the Riyadh Agreement or earlier in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen and the laws in force in its state and in effect until September 21, 2014 , which is the date of the Houthi militia coup and their forcible control of state institutions and the government of the Republic of Yemen .
Regardless of the extent of the disagreement or agreement with the proposals of the Southern Transitional Council and those demanding the end of the unity and the return of the two parts, their realist practices are still limited within the framework of the theoretical political and media position, and the institutions of the Republic of Yemen, its constitution and laws are still operating in various southern governorates, including the capital, Aden, and not. The whole world continues to treat the Yemeni government institutions in Aden and the rest of the southern governorates as the institutions of the Republic of Yemen.
The transitional presents its southern identity as a solution to the crises that afflicted the unity state, stresses that it expresses the demands of the people in the south and does not impose any options on it, and affirms that it seeks solutions within the interests of the region and the Arab alliance, and the most that it declares is to protect the option that the people of the south will decide, and that it will not allow By overcoming these options that existed before its establishment, and that it was established to protect it, but it was not a reason for them, unlike what the Houthis did.
Despite all of this, the Brotherhood is exerting a great effort to continue the battles against the STC, and to close any doors of discussions with the aim of analyzing the realistic facts that have become Yemen, south and north.
In return for the continuation of the incitement against the south in general and the transitional in particular, the Brotherhood overlooks all aspects of real separatism that have become within the limits of Houthi’s authority.
Although the Houthi militia, the Iranian arm in Yemen, since its coup and its control of power in September 2014, is establishing a forced separatist reality, as it forms a separatist statelet from the legitimacy and state of the Republic of Yemen and from the options of all Yemenis who reject its authority and religious mandate.
Al-Houthi separatism ... Evidence, facts and ideas
Al-Houthi subordinates the state in the capital, Sanaa, and the areas of control of his armed men to a structure that has nothing to do with the Constitution of the Republic of Yemen, the powers that he defines, nor the powers stipulated for each authority and each of those authorities, as state institutions in the Houthi areas are managed under the direct supervision of the militia leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, who has no An executive quality that grants him the exercise of the powers he exercises that makes him the first and last man and the owner of the final word in every little thing about the state, its institutions and its performance.
Analysts have no difficulty in linking and explaining the position of the militia leader in the de facto authority of the Houthis as a reproduction of the experience of the State of Iran in which the guide is the first man and the final decision-maker in everything related to the affairs of the Iranian state with his religious holiness as the guardian of the jurist and political holiness as a leader revolution.
However, the experience in Iran is based on the country's constitution, but in Yemen, its constitution criminalizes theocratic rule based on the claim of the sanctity that the Houthis and their militias confer on their leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, whom they describe as the master of knowledge, the consort of the Qur’an, and the leader of the revolution and claim that he is the grandson of the Messenger of Islam.
From the same central issue of hostility to the constitution arises the practices and influence of so-called supervisors who were created by the militias as elements that granted them the powers to manage state institutions alongside the officially appointed executives and by decisions issued by the so-called Supreme Political Council and the militia government, and these are the owners of the order and the prohibition in everything related to the performance of state institutions In the capital, Sanaa, and even the smallest area or village in militia-controlled areas.
Rather, these supervisors vary between a general supervisor, a political supervisor, an economic supervisor, a cultural supervisor, and a social supervisor, which de facto eliminates the powers and competencies of officials of state institutions and replaces them with those supervisors who carry out their work without any constitutional or legal support.
These militias have deliberately violated all the provisions of the constitution and the laws in force by deliberately producing a state within the state, thus establishing new structures and institutions alternative to state institutions and granting them the powers and competencies of the official institutions stipulated in the constitution of the Republic of Yemen and the laws of its state. Examples of this are many, the most prominent of which is the so-called Supreme Council for the Administration of Humanitarian Affairs. And confronting disasters, the Justice Committee, the General Authority for Zakat, and the General Authority of Endowments.
And all of them are the separatism of the reference and the separatism of the scope of their work, which is recognized only by those who oppress the Houthi authority.
Militia separatism is not limited to the creation of these institutions outside the framework of the provisions of the constitution and laws of the Republic of Yemen, but rather extends to the process of appointments that take place in these new institutions and structures, which are all confined to the Houthi leaders who are called the Hashemites, especially the Hashemites, mainly from the Saada governorate. Other appointments that include the rest of state institutions, which are all aimed at consecrating the family of the leader of the Houthi militia, and the dedication of dynastic separatism by restricting appointments to the most important and prominent existing state institutions or the newly created structures for those who claim affiliation with Hashemism, and the consolidation of regional separatism by granting the sons of Saada the lion's share of the positions of state institutions Military and civilian.
In addition, the Houthi militias have deliberately tampered with all the constitutional and legal texts and made legal amendments that affect the essence of laws related to equality between citizens, as happened with the amendments they made to the Zakat law in force and its executive regulations and its inclusion in a text confirming the dynastic tendency by granting the so-called khums to those who claim to be Banu Hashem, which are the amendments. Which not only represents evidence of the practices of these separatist militias, but also proves the essence of the dynastic and sectarian ideology of these militias that bestow on themselves the character of holiness and see others as mere slaves in them, and confirms the fact that this movement is ahead and its tendency to restore the rule of the Yemenis according to the theories of the front rule that eliminated it. The Republican System in the September 26 Revolution, 1962.
In addition to all of the above, the militias' practices to impose additional customs on all imported goods and goods entering their areas of control without any constitutional or legal document that allow them to impose any customs duties on any goods or goods that have been customsed at the outlets of the Republic of Yemen crown all its separatist practices that It confirms that this Houthi movement is a true separatist militia movement, and that its goal is to establish a separatist state of its own.
