East Sana'a setbacks: a soft performance for Islah disrupts the front facing Houthi
English - Saturday 01 February 2020 الساعة 04:07 pm
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Less than ten days was the period during which the Houthi militia was able to achieve significant progress east of Sanaa towards Marib Governorate, inflicting great losses in the ranks and equipment of camps operating under the cover of legality, but in reality it is affiliated with the Islah Party, the Muslim Brotherhood branch in Yemen, as the party has accumulated in this province has tens of thousands of its supporters and made it a private recruitment center and an independent financial source of revenue from the oil and gas revenues available in the province.
The Islah failed to protect the most important stronghold that absorbed its supporters, continuing its soft and even deliberate performance, as some interested people see, in resolving its positions on nationally articulated issues, as a result of calculations that usually confuse priorities without distinguishing between what is strategic and national and what is tactical political.
Naham battle
A ceremonial statement, on Wednesday, of the Houthi militia spoke about controlling all areas of Naham district of the Sana'a governorate, and several districts in Marib and Al-Jawf governorates, to the east.
The statement said that the militia occupied an area of more than 2,500 square kilometers, equivalent to three times the size of the state of Bahrain, and during the military operations there the Houthis pointed to the displacement of "17 military brigades and twenty battalions and seize their equipment completely" stationed in Naham, in addition to overcoming the positions of two brigades military personnel in Sarwah, Marib, and three brigades in Al-Jawf, according to the Houthi statement.
Houthi exaggerations, according to military observers, but in reality, there was a setback confirmed by neutral information, for forces and equipment that were able to contribute significantly to the liberation of the capital Sana'a from the grip of the Houthi militia, while popular resistance with modest weapons managed in the year 2015 formed from tribal groups defeating the militia from most of Marib, Al-Jawf, and today it has restored its role in rectifying the military situation there.
The recent clashes, east of Sanaa, reinforced the failure of the Islah Party to manage the current national battle, politically by its tendency to weaken the anti-Houthi front, and militarily with the failure of the confrontation, or military collusion for political purposes, as some believe.
Brotherhood march
Since the royal republican conflict in the 1960s, the hostility of the Brotherhood Center to Abdulnasser, and the years of harmony with the Saudi authority affected in pushing the Muslim Brotherhood, north of Yemen, through their tribal influence to settle the Yemeni issue by emptying its progressive social content, initially in an attempt to pass the Islamic State’s formula as an alternative to the republic and monarchy in the mid-1960s, then in the reconciliation between the last two parties in March 1970 that gave the monarchists much greater political space for their military power on the ground.
Al-Islah dealt with the Houthi rebellions, 2004-2010, in what is known as the six Saada wars with a tactical view aimed at exhausting the authority of the late President Ali Abdullah Saleh, despite the warnings of national leaders headed by Dr. Abdul Karim Al-Iryani that the Houthi threat affects the Yemeni society and the achievements of Yemenis at various levels, and after the 2011 crisis Islah continued their insufficient vision of the Houthis, prompting the government to avoid Saada wars, and for the militia to take possession of the weapons of most of the military brigades in the northwestern area under the leadership of Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, the strategic ally of the Brotherhood and their military arm within the authority.
Reform continued in his policies, by aborting the battle to liberate Al-Hodeidah through his rush towards the achievement of the Stockholm Agreement, and fabricating problems with the joint forces in the Yemeni West Coast and the Southern Transitional Council forces, and before them with the forces of Abi Abbas in the city of Taiz.
External links
The outreach of Islah as a branch of the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood has included non-Yemeni data that have largely governed party politics in Yemeni and regional files.
These soft policies for Islah were linked internally to the history of the Brotherhood in Yemen, and its lack of practical vision of the Houthi militia as a strategic enemy, at least at the same level directed towards the joint forces, especially the national resistance led by Tariq Saleh, and the forces of the Transitional Council.
The Islah behaviors overlapped with outside activities, mainly regional, related to the leadership of the Arab coalition in Yemen by Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, which still include the Yemeni Brotherhood in the lists of terrorism for each of them, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the regional differences between them with Qatar and Turkey associated with the reform with financial and investment relations and ideological and political approaches, and at the same time enjoying good relations with Iran, the ideological, financial, political and military financier of the Houthis.
The relationship of Islah with the Palestinian Hamas movement as two branches of one organization, and the latter's relations with the first Iranian proxy in the Arab region, the Lebanese Hezbollah, along with its direct relations with Iran since the Palestinian-Palestinian split, also curb the Islah position of the Houthi militia in the category of strategic danger to the party and the country.
The foregoing confirms the leaks of Brotherhood leaderships in the international organization with leaders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards under Turkish sponsorship, during which the most important topics of the agreement were standing against Saudi Arabia in the war in Yemen, and at home, the statements of the Houthi leader Muhammad al-Bakhiti about the existence of an unspoken truce with the pro-islah fronts, that Al-Bakhiti denied it, but the facts supported it.
The Naham, Marib and Al-Jawf defeats, and the long truce in Taiz in exchange for political and media attacks on the joint and the Transitional Council, represents a natural result with the policies of the Brotherhood's links in Yemen, and at the same time, it raises a big question for the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia about the possibility of Islah actually joining the front facing the Iranian Houthi project.
